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The aim of the thesis was to explore and develop an insight on various security 
aspects and practices that need to be considered while designing embedded 
products. The thesis was commissioned by Bittium Oy.  
 
Design requirements were gathered from the customer of the project and they 
were further consolidated based on industry practices and standards. Solutions 
were developed in C language over Linux operating system using tools; Eclipse 
IDE,  Hardware Debuggers, version control tools GIT and Gerrit for continuous 
integration methodology. The project was executed in the Iterative software de-
velopment lifecycle model. 
 
The project was completed successfully and delivered to the client by 2016. 
This thesis also extends the core topic a bit further by discussing some of the 
best practices for designing secure products and some of the future roadmaps 
and technologies in the area as part of conclusion. 
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VOCABULARY 
AppArmor A Linux Security Module 
BYOD Bring Your Own Device 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Security in embedded systems has been gaining attention every passing day. 
With the advent of IoT and cloud technologies, security is ubiquitous and has 
found its way in most of the fields like telecom, aerospace, healthcare, smart, 
wearable devices and defence. Its presence is set to increase with the upcom-
ing technologies, such as like Cloud, robotics, machine learning and AI, and it 
has not hit the peak. 
Given its importance, security should be treated as an integral part of design 
which should be considered right from the product conception stage. Security 
should be built into the system across multiple levels, often referred as a lay-
ered approach. It is not feasible or often viable to design a totally fool-proof sys-
tem. Thus, designers should rather focus on systems that can be difficult to 
compromise and can reduce the risk to an acceptable level. Amit and Barnum 
state (1.) that it is much easier to find vulnerabilities in soft-ware than it is to 
make software secure. This can be applied when designing the product end to 
end and it is not limited to just software. 
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2 DRIVERS FOR DEVICE SECURITY 
In the current IoT (Internet of Things) age, it is possible to we pretty much can 
assume that almost every entity acts as a connected node in the network. The 
list includes but is not limited to, mobile phones, surveillance IP cameras, con-
sumer appliances, parking spaces, power plants, cars and mass transportation 
vehicles. (2.) By the year 2020, analysts estimate that there could be 50 billion 
Internet connected devices which is only bound to grow. (2.) 
This also means that this increasing number of nodes needs to be protected in 
the network: not only to establish a secure, reliable communication but also run 
a device without compromising the device’s integrity and authenticity. These are 
the primary non-functional requirements that are targeted to be achieved by the 
security solutions. 
Devices can be compromised either by running unauthorized software or by 
software being subject to hacking. Compromised devices can result in exposing 
users or organization secrets, such as cryptographic keys, information stealing 
and assets loss. This can have wider financial implications. It comprises user 
privacy and creates a blow to confidentiality. Thus, it is extremely important to 
have appropriate security solutions that can detect and repel any such attacks, 
and perform a damage control and an incident response mechanism in the 
event of any such attacks.  
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3 SECURITY ATTACKS 
The formal attack terminology widely used by industry consists of attack trees, 
attack windows and patterns that are used to describe any attacks. 
Attacks can be classified based on certain parameters, such as attacker’s ob-
jectives, impacts, Origin, phase of introduction, technology employed and ex-
ploitability. The purpose of any attacks is to achieve a desired goal that can 
range from data stealing, inflicting serious damage and crippling the system, 
hobby attacks and academic or institutional attacks as part of research to ex-
pose vulnerabilities. In the attack terminology, the purpose of an attack is 
viewed as a root. And by initiating an attack, attacker’s target is to reach the 
root of the attack tree.  
Attack trees also provide a formal and methodical way of describing the security 
of systems based on varying attacks. (3.) In an attack tree with only "or" 
branches, this consists of all paths from a leaf node to the root node. Such 
paths are also known as "attack paths." In a tree with some "and" branches, an 
attack pattern may be a sub-tree of the attack tree that includes the root node 
and at least one leaf node. (1.) Attack patterns provide a coherent way of teach-
ing designers how their systems may be attacked and how they can effectively 
defend them. (3.) Different attack types are described below in detail 
3.1 Attack types 
3.1.1 Focused attack 
Focused attacks are highly focused on particular or specific kinds of systems or 
environments or ecosystems. This kind of attack has no limitation on time, 
money and resources. The most practical examples of these kinds of attacks 
are to targeting to defence installations and penetrating enemy communication 
lines. The most recent example of this kind of attack is building of “stuxnet” 
which is targeted to attack at only Siemens systems in Iran. 
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3.1.2 Cryptanalytic attacks 
Cryptanalytic is a study of techniques to unravel the meaning of an encrypted 
text without access to secret keys. Cryptanalysis techniques are used to decrypt 
the ciphered text without really accessing the encryption keys. Doing a crypta-
nalysis requires working knowledge of the system and knowing the internals of 
cryptography which in practice means uncovering the secret key. These attacks 
are briefly classified as plain and cipher text attacks and are explained below. 
Known plain text attack 
In this kind of attack, the attacker will have access to at least one pair of a plain 
text and corresponding cipher text which are not explicitly chosen and act as in-
puts for further analysis. (43.) These plain texts are usually obtained via eaves-
dropping or from parities who already possess the encryption key. The results 
are used to break the rest of the encryption in the system by tracing out the se-
cret key. 
Chosen plain text attack 
A chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is an attack model for a cryptanalysis which 
presumes that the attacker can obtain the cipher texts for arbitrary plaintexts. 
(4.) In this kind of attack, the attacker feeds a pre-chosen text into the cipher or-
acle after which they analyse the result and in the worst case they can find the 
secret key.  
Two forms of chosen plain text attacks are a batch chosen plain text attack and 
an adaptive plain text attack. The batch chosen plain text chooses all the plain 
texts before it analyses the ciphered text where as in the adaptive chosen text 
attack, a cryptanalyst requests for additional cipher texts after analysing the re-
sults of previous cipher operations.  
Known cipher text attacks 
Under known cipher text attacks also referred as Ciphertext only attack (COA), 
the attacker has access to bunch of cipher texts mostly obtained either by 
eavesdropping or stealing. Also here the attacker will not have access to more 
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cipher texts or will not have the luxury of choosing a cipher text or producing 
more. In this attack, attacker has access only to the encrypted message, as the 
language is known a frequency analysis could be attempted. In this situation the 
attacker does not know anything about the contents of the message, and must 
work from ciphertext only. (44.) This is certainly one of the weakest attacks as 
the attacker will have nothing to work against other than a few cipher texts in 
hand. 
Chosen cipher text attacks (CCA) 
A chosen cipher text attack is a scenario in which the attacker has the ability to 
choose cipher texts and to view their corresponding decryption’s plaintext. (5.) 
In this kind of attack, the attacker selects the cipher text, sends it to the victim, 
and is given in return the corresponding plaintext or some part thereof. (6.) 
It is essentially the same scenario as a chosen plaintext attack but it is applied 
to a decryption function instead of the encryption function, which means that the 
attacker will be able to produce a clear text from a set of pre-selected ciphered 
text messages from the decryption oracle. 
Chosen cipher text attacks can be adaptive or non-adaptive. Under non adap-
tive cipher text attacks, the attacker chooses certain cipher texts in advance for 
decrypting them. The clear texts obtained are not used for the next cipher oper-
ations. A chosen-plaintext attack is called adaptive if the attacker can choose 
the cipher texts depending on the previous outcomes of the attack. (6.) Servers 
using the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation and RSA PKCS1 are 
under certain circumstances vulnerable to adaptive chosen-cipher text attacks 
and such attacks allow an attacker to recover the encrypted data. (7.) This 
means that adaptive cipher text attacks are more context based and a result of 
outcome of previous operations. These attacks may be quite practical in the 
public-key setting. Bleichenbacher (8.) demonstrated that a plain RSA is vulner-
able to a chosen cipher text attack and some implementations of RSA may also 
be vulnerable to an adaptive chosen cipher text attack. 
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The chances of finding the secret key with chosen cipher-text attacks is more 
than simple plain text attack.  
Lunchtime Attack 
Lunchtime attacks are also referred to as a midnight attack or a CCA1 attack. 
This kind of attack is targeted by attackers when the owner or user of the sys-
tem is away or often when the system is not logged in. The idea is that the sys-
tem is vulnerable and there is often less or no resistance when there is no ac-
tive user who otherwise would be more challenging to penetrate. During this 
time, the attacker will generate pre-chosen cipher text quarries which are valid 
until the period of time after which penetrating will be difficult. 
Adaptive cipher text attack 
An adaptive cipher text attack is also referred as a CCA2 attack and it is 
stronger in nature compared to CCA1. This attack relies on selecting a cipher 
dynamically at runtime whenever the attacker is posed of challenge. 
This is an interactive based attack where the attacker sends a stream of ci-
phered texts to be decrypted and subsequent ciphered texts are chosen  de-
pending on the responses from the system (7.). 
In an increasing order from weakness to strength, the above attacks can be 
sorted as a known cipher text attack, a known plain text attack, a chosen plain 
text attack and a chosen cipher text attack. 
3.1.3 Network attacks 
In this world of ever increasing networking, systems have become very attrac-
tive targets for external attacks through the network. Networking attacks mostly 
rely on monitoring, spoofing or masquerading of network traffic. 
Passive attacks 
A passive attack monitors the unprotected or weekly encrypted communication 
between two nodes for capturing authentication information or passwords which 
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can be passed to parties who would or have the ability to compromise the sys-
tem. 
Active attacks 
Active attackers penetrate the system by circumventing the security and break-
ing the protection of existing systems. They can cause undesired effects by ex-
ecuting their malicious code and injecting viruses or Trojan horses. Active at-
tacks can have varied effects right from minor ones to bringing down the whole 
system or network especially if the attack is on servers.  
 
 
 FIGURE 1. Example of attacks on embedded systems (11.) 
Insider attack 
These are the attacks that are perpetrated from inside the organization or per-
sons who have genuine access to the system. Insider attacks come from dis-
loyal persons, persons with malicious intent or dissatisfied employees inside 
from an organization. 
Phishing attack 
Phishing attacks are attacks where the attacker will design fake almost identical 
web sites through which they direct users to login with credentials. These cre-
dentials will be recorded and used by attackers to log into proper websites 
 16 
 
which can result in stealing of vital information or can even result in financial 
frauds if the target is banking sites. 
Hijack and spoof attacks 
An IP spoofing attack is one in which the source IP address of a packet is 
forged. There are generally two types of spoofing attacks: IP spoofing used in 
DoS attacks and man in the middle attacks (9.). 
The attacker can hijack the communication sessions and disconnect the one of 
the node. Under a hijacked session, other connected party is still under the im-
pression that they are communicating with the original party and can still pass 
some vital private or secret information. 
3.2 Classification of attackers 
Class1: Clever Outsiders 
Outsiders are external attackers exploiting a certain weakness in the system, 
they have certain knowledge of the system. 
Class2: Knowledgeable insiders 
Insider attackers are the ones who have the needed technical expertise as well 
as access to specialized tools to break into the system. 
Class3: Funded Organizations 
Organizations fund attacks with focused objectives. Here, attackers have in-
depth knowledge and no restriction on funding. They are also equipped with 
highly specialized tools to break open the systems. 
TABLE 1: Classification of attacks calibrated against different parameters, 
demonstrated in black hat conference by Joe Grand (10.). 
 
Resource Hacker class 
(Class1) 
Academic 
(Class 2) 
Organized 
(Class 3) 
Government 
(Class 4) 
Time Limited Moderate Large Large 
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Budget < $1000 $10K – $100k >$100k Unknown 
Creativity Varies High Varies Varies 
Detectability High High Low Low 
Target Challenge Publicity Money Varies 
Number Many  Moderate Few Unknown 
Organized No No Yes Yes 
Release Info Yes Yes Varies No 
 
3.3 Levels of difficult 
TABLE 2. Attack difficulty (10.) 
 
Level Name Description 
1 None Primitive ,No special tools or 
skills needed 
2 Intent Minimal skills needed to 
compromise the system 
3 Common tools Technically competent, Can 
be dealt with tools available 
in the market 
4 Unusual tools Can be compromised with 
tools, is  available to most 
people 
5 Special tools With specialized tools and 
with expertize only available 
in universities or government 
6 In Laboratory Major effort needed, Only 
available to few facilities in 
the world. 
 
3.4 Attack vectors 
Attack vectors are typical routes via which an attacker can gain access and af-
ter that exploit the vulnerabilities in the system in order to achieve their objec-
tive. Typical attack vectors are eves dropping, brute force attacks, injecting 
crafted packets, reverse engineering and fabrication by counterfeit assets of a 
product.  
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4 CLASSIFIYING VULNERABILITIES 
According to the CVE website, a vulnerability is a mistake in software code that 
provides an attacker with direct access to a system or network. For example, 
the vulnerability may allow an attacker to pose as a super user or system ad-
ministrator to gain full access privileges. (12.) 
An exposure, on the other hand, is defined as a mistake in software code or 
configuration that provides an attacker with indirect access to a system or net-
work. (12.) Classification of attacks and vulnerabilities can help to understand 
the tools, remedies and approaches that can help us to contain, trace and over-
come these vulnerabilities. 
4.1 Classification by SDLC (Software Development Lifecycle) 
Vulnerabilities can be classified based on the phase of the software develop-
ment life-cycle they usually appear. Some of the popular lifecycle phases that a 
have higher chance to see system vulnerabilities are design, testing, deploy-
ment and maintenance phases. (45.) 
Typical examples of vulnerabilities in a design phase can include a wrong 
choice of OSS components, protocol and algorithms, using of untested reusable 
libraries or code that may not be really a fool proof. Often vulnerabilities in de-
sign phases are easy to exploit and difficult to plug. 
During a maintenance phase, systems can be prone to vulnerabilities that come 
along with improper bug fixes and components that are not updated on timely 
and priority basis. In case the system is using OSS or reusable closed sources, 
system integrators need to update the system with the latest fixes from up-
stream.  Leaving them unmaintained can expose holes in the system makes the 
system an attractive target for exploit. Vulnerabilities that appear due to coding 
errors, relaxed compiler settings and bad design of APIs are few that evolve 
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during the implementation phase. Some of these can be addressed by employ-
ing a stricter process approach towards using code analysis tools and fine tun-
ing the compiler optimization options. 
In a typical software development life-cycle, system shall be configured to relax 
certain hard rules to accommodate testing and debugging. Eventually, If these 
are not closed can act as potential attack points. E.g. opening debug ports, 
opening access points in hardware. 
4.2 Classification by attackers objective 
One of the most prominent approaches is to enumerate the attacks by attackers 
objectives, such as gaining root access and higher privileges, creating a denial 
of service, stealing confidential and sensitive data, executing malicious code 
and Integrity and security policy violation. 
4.3 Classification by attacks by their location in OSI model and their origin  
One approach of classifying the vulnerabilities is by deciding where exactly they 
appear in the 7 layered OSI reference model. In practice this means segregat-
ing the vulnerability into one of the seven baskets (application, presentation, 
session, network, link and physical layer). Attacks can also be enumerated de-
pending on their original location in the network, such as a local system, intranet 
(Ethernet network), an internet, particular protocol (e.g. TCP/IP) and a wireless 
network. ( 46.) 
Mitigations for addressing these exploits can be implemented on different ob-
jects at different layers in OSI model. A mitigation may be applied at the source 
code level that eliminates a security flaw and the associated vulnerability, or a 
work-around can be applied at a system or network level to prevent the security 
flaw from being exploited. (47.)  But this kind of classification may not be appro-
priate at all times as many of the times vulnerabilities can fall between layers 
and hence, it is difficult to segregate on this layered approach. For example, it is 
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not often easy to decide on whether the vulnerability is exactly in the OS  in the 
application layer or both as contention results which is right and wrong. 
4.4 Classification by effected technology 
Systems get vulnerable though holes created by string exploits and buffer over-
flows which are not unusual in the C language. (47.) Likewise, systems can be 
prone to attacks that exploit meta characters vulnerabilities in the LDAP and 
SQL Injection with database languages. 
Systems that run code with memory leaks and malicious code are vulnerable to 
a resource exhaustion and thus can block the system resources resulting in 
DoS attacks. This kind of technology classification may not suit for vulnerabili-
ties that spawn across technologies, not just limited to one. 
4.5 Classification by errors 
System can be made vulnerable as a result of improper code design and pro-
grammatic errors that appear and during the implementation phase. A few of 
them are freeing the memory more than once and executing code  from mali-
cious memory locations or locations program either did not allocate or have any 
control on.  
At times, unclosed holes that are left in production code to accommodate de-
bugging for diagnostic purposes can spell trouble and can be exploited by at-
tackers. (47.) 
4.6 Classification by enabled attack scenario 
Vulnerabilities can also be classified based on precise type of attack scenarios. 
As seen above, Denial of Service is an effect that can happen due to multiple 
reasons, such as memory leaks or buffer overflows.  Thus, it is sensible to clas-
sify the vulnerabilities on the nature of an attack scenario rather than based on 
effects. 
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Examples of attack scenarios are cryptographic attacks, network attacks, se-
cure storage attacks, Software attacks, entropy attacks and malicious code exe-
cution. Techniques employed to execute these attacks can be chosen-known/ci-
pher text attacks, compromised boot sequence and string exploits.  
4.7 CLASP Classification 
CLASP (Comprehensive light weight application security process) enumerates 
vulnerabilities based on software events and conditions that are responsible for 
the vulnerability. (13.) 
4.8 Range and type errors 
Generic range type errors are errors due to buffer overflow , stack and heap 
overflow , integer overflow , truncation errors, signed and unsigned errors, inte-
ger coercion errors, unchecked indexing of arrays, NULL character misplacing 
for string buffers , NULL pointer dereferencing , usage of freed memory, format 
string and code injection into data areas of memory. (47.) 
4.9 Environmental errors 
The vulnerabilities can be classified based on environment condition in which 
the application is deployed. The same program image can have different prop-
erties when installed in different environments (for e.g. as a result of dynamic 
runtime linkage). (47.) Environmental errors could also occur due to resources 
exhaustion (e.g. sockets, kernel objects, file descriptors, memory), execution of 
untrusted code and data, system variable manipulations (e.g. system paths, li-
brary paths), spoofing of system events, a failure to protect secure data and 
keys, a TRNG generation failure and insufficient entropy for PRNG. 
4.10 Synchronization and timing errors 
Situations leading to synchronization and timing errors are race conditions in 
code (unlocking code via kernel objects) , race condition in signal handlers, im-
proper references for symbolic names which change at runtime , failure to drop 
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user privileges at right times soon after task is accomplished, leaking sensitive 
information through error messages , time to check and time to use errors (for 
example , resources can change their state between a window of  time lag be-
tween their validation and actual usage). Potential race conditions in the design 
could also bring up new vulnerabilities that attackers tend to exploit. At an even 
higher level of abstraction, these vulnerabilities could be classified as a logic or 
design error, since a resource (in this case, the file or socket) can be deleted 
while in use. (47.) Seacord & Householder in his work (47.) stated that, the low-
est level of abstraction this vulnerability could be classified as an input valida-
tion problem, since the programmer fails to ensure that the object being vali-
dated is the same object the (potentially) insecure operation is performed on. 
4.11 Protocol Errors ( 46.) 
Protocols errors are the ones that usually arise out of protocol, algorithm errors 
that are as a result of improper use or wrong choices. ( 46.) Such vulnerabilities 
are from failure to check for certification expiration and revocation, key ex-
change without proper authentication, failure to encrypt communication, failure 
to do integrity check where ever needed, usage of hardcoded and stored pass-
words or keys, trusting certain IP address or range of IPs that can be spoofed 
easily, using of broken, week or risker cryptographic algorithms, improper usage 
of OSS components and failure to protect confidential and sensitive data. 
4.12 Generic Errors 
Errors that are enumerated based on their generic nature are improper error 
and exception handling, improper break and jump instructions in code, ignoring 
return values from functions ,uninitialized variables, failure to free unused re-
sources and memory and unintentional assignment when comparison two val-
ues etc. (.47) 
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4.13 Popular Dictionaries for Attack Taxonomy 
MITRE is a government funded non-profit organization which publishes and 
controls standards to be used by community. Below are the popular dictionaries 
of publicly known information security vulnerabilities and exposures maintained 
by MITRE. (14.) 
4.13.1 PLOVER 
PLOVER is a primary list of working examples intended for researchers. It lists 
over 1,400 real world vulnerabilities by their CVE IDs organised as a conceptual 
framework. This framework offers a platform for discussion for a further analysis 
and describing them in a further detailed manner. PLOVER is targeted at those 
who are engaged in analysing vulnerabilities to understand and communicate 
them in a more abstract level. (14.) 
CVE 
CVE stands for Common Venerability Enumeration, which precisely describes a 
certain pin-pointed instance in a system or a vendor through which exploits can 
happen. For example, CVE-2015-7547, points to a specific venerable instance 
in eglibc for an attack. 
4.13.2 CWE 
CWE stands for Common Weakness Enumeration, which essentially deals with 
underlying software weakness in general but not specific to a particular instance 
in a system. Vulnerabilities can emerge from weakness and they may have po-
tential for getting targeted. The goal of CWE is to educate the programmers or 
system designers to For example, CWE-367 is time to check and time to use 
weakness spotted in software but it is not limited to any specific component or 
instance in any system. 
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4.13.3 CAPEC 
To respond to attacks effectively, the community needs to think outside of the 
box and have a firm grasp of the attacker’s perspective and the approaches 
used to exploit software systems. (15.) CAPEC provides this information to the 
community in order to help to enhance security throughout the software devel-
opment lifecycle and to support the needs of developers, testers, and educa-
tors. (15.) Therefore, CAPEC is a publicly available catalogue of attack patterns 
along with a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy created to as-
sist in the building of secure software. (15.) While CWE is a list of software 
weakness types, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 
(CAPEC™) is a list of the most common methods attackers use to exploit vul-
nerabilities resulting from CWEs. Used together, CWE and CAPEC provide un-
derstanding and guidance to software development personnel of all levels as to 
where and how their software is likely to be attacked, thereby equipping them 
with the information they need to help them build more secure software.  
Below is the pyramid described by Knowledge Consulting group (16.) on how 
CWE- CVE- CAPEC stack each other. 
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FIGURE 2. Relationship between CWE, CVE, CAPEC (16)  
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5 PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY  
Primary principles of security is to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the consumers, stakeholders and devices in the operating ecosys-
tem.  
“The principle of information security protection of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability cannot be overemphasized: This is central to all studies and prac-
tices in IS. You’ll often see the term CIA triad to illustrate the overall goals for IS 
throughout the research, guidance, and practices you encounter.”—Three goals 
of security by Jim Breithaupt & Mark S. Merkow are shown in figure 3. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. CIA Triad (17.)  
5.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentially refers to a restriction of access to sensitive data from unauthor-
ized people. Loss of sensitive information, such as device or user passwords, 
credit card and banking credentials could result in identity theft, financial impli-
cations and compromised privacy.  
According to Mathew and Stan (18.), designers should strongly consider 
measures to ensure confidentiality and prevent sensitive information from 
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reaching unauthorized people, while simultaneously making sure that the right 
people can in fact get it: Access must be restricted only to those authorized to 
use the data in question. It is common, as well, for data to be categorized ac-
cording to the amount and type of damage that could be done should it fall into 
unintended hands. (18.) 
5.2 Integrity 
According to study published in a security blog by Mathew and Stan (18.), integ-
rity involves maintaining the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of data 
over its entire life cycle. Data generated at a source must not be changed in 
transit, and steps must be taken to ensure that data cannot be altered by unau-
thorized people (for example, in a breach of confidentiality). For ensuring data 
integrity designers can employ the measures like, consider file permissions, 
user access controls, employing cryptographic checksums for verification. Also, 
designers need to plan for backups in the event of any damage to data to re-
store it to its correct state. (18.) 
5.3 Availability 
Terry refers to availability as one of the pillars in the CIA traid (19.), According 
to a report published by her, availability of information refers to ensuring that au-
thorized parties are able to access the information when needed. This can also 
be applied just not only to information, but also to systems that cater services. 
DoS attacks on such systems will deprive and deny users to access systems, 
thus hurting the systems availability. If critical services (systems) are attacked 
and brought down, it could cripple services and caste impact on economy and 
people’s lives. DoS attacks on mission critical systems such as aircraft and 
space ships can hurt the availability and can bring down the whole system 
threating the lives. 
Terry (19) advocates the importance of taking regular backups to ensure the 
data availability in the event of any natural disasters. Redundancy might be a 
solution for information services that are highly critical. These redundant copies 
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can be stored in different geographical areas to mitigate against natural disas-
ters and intentional attacks by mala fide people. Designers, while designing em-
bedded products should ensure that the systems can repel or filter such Dos at-
tacks, have proper intrusion detections mechanisms, can raise an alarm, have 
damage control mechanisms in place in the event of any such attacks. 
Extra security equipment or software such as firewalls and proxy servers, can 
guard against downtime and unreachable data due to malicious actions, such 
as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and network intrusions. (19.) 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Potential Impacts for CIA (20.) 
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6 DESIGN CHALLENGES  
6.1 Resource limitations 
Embedded software has traditionally evolved as "software on devices with lim-
ited resources". In this traditional view, the principal problem is resource limita-
tions (small memory, small data word sizes, and relatively slow clocks). (21.) 
Given their size, portability and cost sensitiveness, they also often come with 
other resource limitations, such as computational power, absence of protective 
theft and shielding technologies when compared with a larger system. Among 
the examples, the Mission Critical system has much more stringent size and 
weight requirements than the others because of its use in a flight vehicle. (22.) 
For consumer devices, such as mobile phones and IoT devices, apart from size 
and computational power limitations, it is extremely important for these kinds of 
devices to be designed keeping the security of the user data and software at-
tacks in mind. 
While designing embedded systems, designers have to work with those above 
mentioned design challenges and at the same time they have to ensure users’ 
integrity of data and secrets, and damage limitation in case a system or a de-
vice is compromised due to a multitude of reasons.  
6.2 Reliability 
Embedded software systems are generally held to a much higher reliability 
standard than any general purpose software. (21.) They are also known to work 
in extreme and tough conditions, therefore they are prone to more failures. 
Sometimes these the failures associated with embedded systems can be quite 
risky and threating. They can cause substantial damage in terms of monitory or 
personal loss. In mission-critical applications, such as an aircraft flight control, a 
severe personal injury or an equipment damage could result from a failure of 
the embedded computer. (22.) A failure to safeguard the user data in a mobile 
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phone can have financial implications. Traditionally, such systems have em-
ployed multiply-redundant computers or distributed consensus protocols in or-
der to ensure a continued operation after an equipment failure. (22.) Thus, it is 
important that, designers create alternate solutions for mission critical systems. 
But IoT devices designers should consider damage limiting functionalities for 
consumers in case of any software attack or physical tampering. 
6.3 Cost constraints 
Most consumer segment devices are designed keeping the cost factor in mind. 
Achieving a reliable system under controlled costs can be challenging for sys-
tem designers. While designing cost consensus devices, designers keep the 
overall system costs controlled by keeping system complexity down, which 
should not affect the integrity or reliability of the overall system.  
6.4 Functionality creep 
Designers tend to improve the functionality of the products to compete in the 
market with their competitors. This is partly because consumers prefer to 
choose products offering the better functionality against the ones that offer more 
secure solutions. Therfore, in this ball game, it is often challenging for designers 
to balance the security features with the functionalities. 
6.5 Knowledge Gap 
A challenge in the area of designing secure solutions arises from the fact that 
attackers have been learning how to exploit the products for several decades, 
but the general solution designers have not kept up with the knowledge that at-
tackers have gained. (3.) Therefore, it will be challenging for designers to get 
ahead of the attackers to come up with good solution. 
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7 MECHANICAL DESIGN ASPECTS 
This chapter introduces mechanical design approaches that should be consid-
ered to bring out a secure product. 
7.1 Product housing 
A typical attack hard point in this case would be a product enclosure and an at-
tack vector where attackers will make an effort to open the casings and access 
to internal circuitry and components. Product designers need to prevent an easy 
access to the product internals by concealing the access points through which 
the device can be opened.  
Some of the safe enclosure techniques currently in use are  
 designing a product with a single piece outer shell. 
 using high melting point glues wherever needed. 
 designing in such a way that the opening of a device needs a complete 
destruction. 
 in addition to the above mentioned, leaving the surface points of device 
accessibility for service personnel who can open the device with special-
ized tools. 
7.1.1 External Interfaces 
External interfaces, such as proprietary connectors, Ethernet, RS232, USB, 
Firewall, JTAG, Wireless (802.11) and Bluetooth are a vital lifeline for the prod-
uct to the outside world so that the device functions properly. In addition to car-
rying the usual device operations, these interfaces also aid in regular mainte-
nance tasks, on-field diagnostic procedures and field programming.  
External interfaces are always attractive targets for hackers as the root of the 
attack tree can originate from here. Attackers indulge in probing, sniffing, flood-
ing and pushing malformed packets through these interfaces. Product designers 
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should be able to defeat all possible attacks that originate from these external 
interfaces. Designers should remember the below mentioned issues while they 
are designing interfaces. 
 A device must transmit only non-sensitive and public information in clear text 
format. 
 All sensitive and confidential information that has to be exchanged over in-
terfaces, must be encrypted. 
 Adequate protection must be added inside the device to defeat spoofing, 
malformed packets. e.g, hardening of OS, strong firewall. 
 Strict no obfuscation policy. Attackers are always ahead of designers and 
can uncover them easily. 
 All the diagnostic ports, backdoor interfaces and JTAG connectors must be 
removed from production software images. Closing them by employing tech-
niques, such as blowing resisters and fuses, is not the best approach as 
they can be reopened by attackers. 
7.1.2 Anti-tamper mechanisms 
Attackers try to gain physical access to a device by tampering to know confiden-
tial information and working internals device. Some of the tamper mechanisms 
worth considering by product designers are described below: 
Tamper resistance 
Tamper resistance relies on restricting physical access to devices. Devices 
must shall be housed and constructed with specialized tamper resistance mate-
rials and mechanisms, such as hardened steel enclosures, a usage of one way 
screws and epoxy coating materials, tight airflow channels, a usage of security 
bits, encapsulating the circuit and critical components to prevent intentional 
probing and tampering due to environment hazards. 
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Products with a well-protected housing would require a partial if not a complete 
destruction of device to open up. It is also essential for designers to lay empha-
sis on such a design that will leave a visible and clear evidence if a tamper at-
tempt is made. 
Tamper evidence 
Tamper evidence mechanisms are designed to ensure that a visible evidence or 
trails are left of an attempted break in. These mechanisms do not protect the 
device or the confidential data in it but they raise awareness that there has been 
an attack on the system. Some of the widely used mechanisms are brittle pack-
ages, crazed aluminum and polished packages, bleeding paints and holo-
graphic tapes. All the above mentioned mechanisms will leave damages on the 
surface which would be hard to be unnoticed. 
Tamper detection 
Tamper detection can be done by installing relevant sensors which detect the 
tamper and trigger the relevant response mechanisms. Some of the widely used 
tamper detection mechanisms that are built into devices are quoted below (23.) 
 Switches that detect a mechanical movement. 
 Sensors that can detect and inform external environmental changes. 
 Closed circuits and cables that are wrapped in and around the device 
for detecting an attempted break, tamper or modification. 
  Monitoring of for the changes in voltages and clock frequencies from 
and to the chips. 
Tamper response 
Systems should trigger shutdown and disable themselves in response to tamper 
detection. They should be designed with a capability to log and generate foren-
sic data for a further analysis of post tamper detection that can be accessed by 
service personnel.  Designers should also consider techniques, such as erasing 
the sensitive data, in response to tamper detection. In products, which houses 
confidential data, keys should protect the data by resorting to erasing methods. 
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Confidential data is either stored in RAM or ROM. Erasing the random access 
memory is relatively easier and it is accomplished by dropping the voltage lev-
els which will effectively clear the memory contents. In case of ROM, a ROM 
overwrite may be needed. There are even cases where a system employs an 
ultimate mechanism of physical destruction by shorting the circuits and render-
ing the device inoperable.  
Further, it should be noted that these tamper response mechanisms do not trig-
ger in case of unintentional actions, accidentally or by environmental factors. 
7.2 PCB design and routing 
Enough precautions should be taken while designing circuitry boards for not let-
ting an easy access to components, such as FPGA, processors and memories. 
An easy access to these components and circuitry can help attackers in reverse 
engineering the product. Designers should look into advanced chip packaging 
technologies while they design PCBs, e.g.  COB (Chip on Board) packaging, 
CIB (Chip In Board) packaging and Ball Grid Array packaging. The product 
should demark or erase all the chip markings either by black topping or using 
other methods, such as small sandering or etching. A failure to remove the chip 
markings will leave potential hints to attackers to learn about the chips behavior 
and their usage by referring their datasheets.   
Sensitive components and circuitry lines should be concealed by using Epoxy 
material around them. Care should be taken during the PCB production not to 
leave test points visibly open and every attempt should be made to obfuscate 
the trace paths and critical lines into inner layers of PCB. Even electromagnetic 
emissions from the product can act as potential attack points which attackers 
can monitor to determine secret information. Thus, every step needs to be 
taken to minimize the emissions by installing an appropriate shielding and tak-
ing care of unprotected I/O busses from ESDs. Well-designed power lines and 
grounding can reduce noise levels and emissions. All unused GPIOs should be 
either disabled or fixed to a predetermined state. 
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7.3 Memory and bus protection 
Designers should be aware that address and control bus lines are prone to 
probing and traffic is not secure. Designers need to design their systems to per-
form secure operations either inside SoC or components that will not use the 
unsecure bus in the system. Memory devices, such as RAM and ROM, are 
known to be unsecure. Even though systems are designed with a proper tamper 
detection and response mechanisms, such as a complete wiping out or erasing 
of data, there is a high chance that traces of data can still be left out. Although 
the product supports security fuses, boot-block protection mechanisms, these 
can be bypassed by die-attacks and chip decapping as attackers can reproduce 
and recreate cryptographic keys or remove security bits. Designers should also 
take steps to limit the time secure data can be stored in memory. The secure 
data should be erased if it is no longer needed. 
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8 HARDWARE ASSISTED SECURITY 
Devices can be made more secure if security use cases utilize hardware solu-
tions or extensions in conjunction with software rather than just as a software 
only solution. In the below sections the focus is on the role of hardware based 
solutions touching associated software functionalities that exploit these special-
ized hardware wherever needed. Security solutions that utilize an underlying 
platform and hardware assistance are more effective than purely software 
based ones.  
8.1 Smart Card 
A smart card is an embedded integrated circuit card with a CPU, memory, and 
at least one peripheral interface to communicate with a host device. (24.)  
Every component in the smart card is deemed secure, basic in execution with 
very less computational power. Smart cards also have a higher level of temper 
resistance because of their size, a complete physical isolation of the trusted 
area and narrow interfaces .The isolated trusted area plus a higher level of tem-
per resistance enables that the trusted services leveraged by a smart card are 
very secure, but very limited in scope due to lower computational capabilities. 
(24.) 
8.2 TPM   
Trusted platform modules (TPM) are dedicated secure crypto-processors which 
are designed to secure hardware or software by integrating cryptographic keys 
into a device. TPM chips are passive and execute commands from the CPU. 
They by no means will decide or control the execution flow. Generally, there are 
additional software components operating from the CPU. They that will interact 
with TPM chips, which would take action upon validating the content from the 
TPM. 
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Global standards of specification for the TPM are controlled by a Trusted com-
puting group (TCG) alliance formed by HP, Intel, AMD and Microsoft. The ob-
jective of the TCG is to develop, define and promote open standards for hard-
ware enabled trust computing and standardize software interfaces across plat-
forms. These specifications aim to provide a platform independent functionality 
that must be provided by any trusted platform by facilitating a common interface 
for a secure computing environment. Thus, protecting and securing the platform 
against hardware and software attacks. There are also criticisms against TPM 
specifications. They are said to cripple the user rights by moving rights manage-
ment from software to computing platform hardware.  
TPM chips come with an internal hardware logic for RSA encryption and de-
cryption, a random number key generator, a tamper proof non-volatile secure 
storage and a hash functionality. Although TCG specifications do not mandate 
the above to be hard wired, chip vendors prefer them as it can be difficult to fulfil 
the TCG specifications by just implementing these via software. 
   Simplified Architecture of the TPM  
 
FIGURE 5. High-level TPM Architecture (25.) 
The first generation chips were physically separate which made the platform 
less secure. Later on they were either mounted in the mother board or embed-
ded into the SoC. Mounting the TPM chips in the motherboard is prone to physi-
cal attacks and it is less secure, too. 
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Mandatory objectives of TPM chips are 
 protecting the encryption and public keys from external stealing or getting 
misused by untrusted components in the system. 
 preventing malicious code access to secret keys inside the TPM. 
TPM chips achieve the above goals by implementing the functionality listed be-
low 
 Authorization: Public key authentication functions that provide on-chip 
key generation using random number generation hardware, verification, 
encryption and decryption functionality. Keys inside the TPM can be 
made to never leave or be visible outside the chip to avoid any kinds of 
phishing attacks and to prevent the key from being copied and used with-
out the TPM. They can also be configured to be used by providing right 
authorization values when only they are unsealed. This in practice 
means that the keys are accessed only when the platform is in a known 
state. 
 Integrity measurement functionality provides the capability to protect the 
private keys to untrusted code. In a trusted boot scenario, the platform 
state (hash of configuration) is stored in PCM registers. The private keys 
are sealed under the specific PCM registers and they get unsealed only if 
the TPM is provided with the same values by which the integrity of the 
system is verified. When an attempt is made to boot the system with an 
unauthenticated image or with a image that has malware or suspicious 
code built in will result in different PCM values. This kind of boot will fail 
the integrity check and will render the keys inaccessible. 
 Attestation functionality: A mechanism where the TPM can certify the 
platform as trustworthy and not breached. By using the attestation, 
trusted clients can prove to the third party that their software is guanine 
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and not compromised. Attestation functions keep a list of software meas-
urements committed to PCRs and can then carry out a signature using 
private keys known only by the TPM. During the attestation operation, 
the evaluating entity will request a TPM quote, which is essentially a 
signed composite hash of selected PCM data and its signature. The gen-
erated TPM quote is compared with the values that are generated during 
provisioning. 
8.2.1 Root of trust for storage management 
The root of trust for storage is a trusted component that lies inside the TPM that 
provides integrity and confidentiality checking for secure storage information in 
the chip. This is achieved using the RSA encryption and integrity checking by 
validating the platform state to a known value. 
8.2.2 Root of trust for reporting  
The root of trust for reporting is a trusted component that resides inside the 
TPM and responsible for reporting the platform state and RSA signed data to 
external parties who ever requests them. 
8.2.3 Root of trust for measurement 
The RTM (root of trust for measurement) is a piece of code external to the TPM 
which is responsible for triggering the measurement of platform state. RTM sits 
inside the core root of trust (CRTM) which is immutable and acts as a root of 
trust for the measuring environment. This is a small bit of immutable an compo-
nent that gets executed upon a device reset and which is never changed in its 
lifetime. 
8.3 Secure Element 
Secure elements are temper-resistant hardware elements which hold device se-
crets and a limited isolated execution environment. They can also be added to any 
device with a micro SD or a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). (24.) They 
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house cryptographic keys which are not exposed to outside world but would exe-
cute crypto operations inside the isolated environment created inside the chip. 
Evicting the secrets out of the chip for illicit use is either hard or impossible to do. 
The main benefits offered by a secure element are 
 Data Protection: Protection of data from unauthorized access (24.) 
 Hardware assisted cryptographic operations: Dedicated inbuilt hardware 
logic for cryptographic functionalities, such as encryption, decryption, hash-
ing etc. (24.) 
 Isolated execution environment: Small defined tasks (applets) which perform 
cryptographic operations with keys and data stored inside the SE, can be 
run in an isolated execution environment without the data leaving the TEE. 
(24.) 
This technology is widely used in the EMV chip on payment cards. Security offered 
by the SE is considered to be on a greater degree of evaluation level (EVL5) com-
pared to a device that offers solutions over the TEE. 
8.4 Hardware assisted boot process 
As part of a hardware assisted boot process, the boot sofware in the device, 
which is supposed to be executed to bring up the device at each stage, is 
verified by a preceeding stage with the help of a hardware mechanism  either 
the TPM or SE. This happens in two phases.  
Figure 6 below depicts the interaction between hardware and software compo-
nents to achieve the two-phase boot verification. As part of a boot process, im-
age signatures of both the traditional OS and its boot loader which is often re-
ferred as the normal world are verified by the trusted execution environment 
(TEE). The trusted execution environment comprises of its TEE boot loader and 
TEE OS with the SE acting as root of trust.  
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Components that are deemed to be unaltered during the lifecycle and immuta-
ble are considered as a root of trust components. They are usually ROM pro-
gramed in factory and they are bound to never change.  On the contrary to the 
applications running in rich a OS, the secure tasks running in the TEE can be 
trusted. Also in this case, the SE is configured as a trusted peripheral and it is 
only accessible from secure tasks that execute in the TEE. In this way, applica-
tions running in traditional OSs make use of secure tasks to access the SE. As 
a consequence, if the TEE becomes unavailable, rich applications would be un-
able to perform secure use cases, such as device identification, device man-
agement, decryption and encryption.
 
FIGURE 6. Architecture of secure execution environment (26.) 
The above figure show that the root of trust components considered here are 
manufacturer’s boot loaders and hash of a trusted public key (usually OEMs) in 
the Secure Element. If not in secure memory, trusted keys can also be stored in 
hardware one time fuse memory which is only accessible to the secure OS.  
These OEM keys are fused as part of series of steps in the assembly factory 
line when the device is manufactured. Under the “hardware assisted secure 
boot”, images that form a chain of verification are pre-signed by the OEMs pri-
vate key corresponding to the fused public key hash in a secure element or fuse 
memory. During the secure boot process, manufacturer’s bootloder verifies the 
signed images, which are signed with a corresponding private key, whose hash 
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of public key is stored in the Secure element. It is purely prerogative of the OEM 
to consider whether the TEE OS is under the root of trust. In case not, even the 
TEE OS and its bootloader need to be verified. If the verification at any stage 
fails, the device assumes to have been tampered and exits the boot phase.  
Until now have been discussed the role of secure element or the TEE OS in a 
secure boot process have been discussed. Alternate solutions also exist, such 
as using TPMs instead of SEs as shown in figure 7. 
8.5 Hardware assisted isolated/trusted execution environments 
As described in figure 7, there are more than one way to realize isolation execu-
tion environments. Critical applications or part of use cases, which need an iso-
lated execution environment to execute to protect confidentiality and integrity 
can be executed in these environments. 
 External security co-processor can be used for executing sensitive opera-
tions and its results can be consumed by the primary processor.  
 Using Embedded Secure Elements (ESE), which will be embedded inside 
the same System On Chip for secure operations. 
 Advent of bus and memory isolation hardware extension logic blocks made it 
possible for a single processor (SoC) to be split into untrusted and trusted 
execution modes.   
Secure peripherals can be accessed only while device is operating in secure 
mode. Untrusted entities cannot gain access to secure peripherals as they 
would run only on non-secure mode. 
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FIGURE 7. TEE Solution Realizations (27.) 
Although a secure element offers a higher degree of security, the TEE is gain-
ing momentum in the Industry as it addresses the most of the industry needs for 
secure applications by offering a higher level of security than any traditional OS, 
without the constraints associated with the secure element. 
Recent trends show that TEE environments are widely used in mobile pay-
ments, enterprise applications, such as BYOD, and in content protection and in 
government electronic ID solutions. 
ARM has come out with a trust zone architecture to facilitate the isolated execu-
tion environment (often referred as secure mode) against the rich operating sys-
tems execution environment (referred as non-secure or normal world mode) by 
maintaining a hardware separation between these two worlds. 
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The trust zone technology (see figure 8) will ensure that data and operations on 
the device remains secure, protecting consumer privacy and enabling a range 
of services, such as mobile banking, payment use-cases and playing multime-
dia entertainment which is meant for consumers and service providers. 
TrustZone is incorporated within the same microprocessor core, enabling the 
protection of on- and off-chip memory. Since the security elements of the sys-
tem are designed into the core hardware, security issues surrounding proprie-
tary, non-portable solutions outside the core, are removed. 
There is a minimal impact on  the core area or performance while trustzone en-
ables developers to build any additional security, for example cryptography, 
onto the secure hardware foundation. 
 
FIGURE 8.ARM Trustzone Architecture (27.) 
Having introduced by ARM 10 years ago, Trustonic and Xilinx were the first 
ones to propose frameworks and solutions utilizing these hardware platforms. 
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This enables the research community (28.) as well as the industry to experiment 
and develop innovative solutions on it. 
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9 SECURITY ARCHITECTURES 
In this chapter it will be discussed the ways software can be designed to exploit 
the specialized hardware modules (discussed in the earlier chapter) that lay 
foundation to secure solutions. This chapter also discusses some profound ar-
chitectures to design software solutions. 
9.1 Static root of trust measurement 
As implied by name, the static root of trust begins with a piece of immutable 
code which has not been changed for the lifetime of platform. This piece of code 
forms the root of trust for the measurement (CRTM). This fundamental entity is 
referred as a trusted building block (TBB) from where the chair of trust origi-
nates. 
In any embedded system the first executable is usually the ROM BIOS code, 
but to enable the static root of trust, there needs to be an additional immutable 
component, which would verify the bios before it starts to execute, and which is 
the Core root of trust for measurement (CRTM). The CRTM is either stored in 
the chip burned in the factory or found in the BIOS as block in the BIOS boot 
block. All that TCG mandates is to have the CRTM to be present in immutable 
and it is a true trusted building block. 
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FIGURE 9.Chain of trust (29.) 
The CRTM entity is responsible for measuring the integrity of the next compo-
nent that follows the boot sequence and for extending the measurement values 
to predefined Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Each of the component 
that executes will need to verify the next one in the boot sequence and to ex-
tend the measurement values to PCRs before transferring the control to the 
next component  
Even though there is not any compromised component in the execution chain, it 
cannot bypass the chain of trust verification. Also, the comprised components 
cannot technically extend its measurement values back to PCRs as shown in 
figure 10 below. 
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FIGURE 10.Chain of Trust, Measured boot in use (29.) 
Of course, this static method to verify is good for load time, It also comes with 
few drawbacks, such as scalability and time to check and time to use (TOC-
TOU) issues.  
Scalability is the issue in case that all the executables, libraries and scripts will 
need to be part of a verified chain as there is no clear definition for a TCB in all 
the major operating systems used today. This is partly because all these com-
ponents are subjected to patching, fixes and a varied order of execution, which 
can potentially change the PCR measurement values. 
The time of measurement plays an important role due to the fact that even 
though the system can be booted in a known state, it is not guaranteed to be in 
the same state at the runtime. Potentially, during the execution of code, attack-
ers can look for vulnerabilities and they can put the system to a unsafe state. It 
is essential to be aware that the Static Root of Trust for Measurement only 
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gives a load-time guarantee not a run-time guarantee, i.e that that is it gives as-
surance of what program has been loaded, not necessarily what is running. 
(29.) 
9.2 Dynamic root of trust for measurement 
The above mentioned shortcoming related to the static root of trust has been 
addressed by the TCG group as part of 1.2 specifications .A dynamic root of 
trust measurement (DRTM) essentially deals with measuring the system state 
not just at the boot time but whenever there is a need for verifying the platform 
arises. The DTRM brings a substantial contribution from hardware side as well. 
Most semiconductor vendors have introduced special instructions (SKINIT, 
SENTER for AMD and Intel) which trigger the creation of controlled and attested 
execution environments in runtime. 
The DRTM relies on small trusted piece of code which is loaded from a trusted 
source whose responsibility is to measure and execute a predefined piece of 
software. The DRTM comes with a short chain of trust when compared to the 
static root of trust measurement. This piece of software, which is launched and 
untainted and not modified right from the device boot time, puts the system into 
the secure state directly. This in practice means that the device gets into the se-
cure state without a need to reboot or a further need to the static root of trust 
management. 
9.3 Multiple Independent layered security (MILS) 
Legacy secure systems were designed around a secure kernel and a trusted 
computing base, with the idea that all the security decisions and the security en-
forcement mechanisms are an integral part of the TCB. (30.) This methodology 
can increase the complexity of the TCB as designers tend to add pump in more 
and more logic there thus creating issues for maintainability.  
From the design paradigm, the MILS architecture stands better compared to the 
legacy one as it forces designers to follow a structured and modular approach. 
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The Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) is a security architecture 
based on the concepts of separation and a controlled information flow imple-
mented by the separation mechanisms, which supports both untrusted and 
trusted code where each level is responsible for its own security domain. Limit-
ing the scope and complexity of the security mechanisms provides users with 
manageable and, more importantly, evaluable implementations. (31.) 
This approach provides applications with mechanisms to control, manage and 
force their security policies in a manner that enforcement mechanisms are al-
ways invoked, mechanisms are non-by-passable, evaluable, and tamperproof. 
(30.) Under the MILS architecture, privileged mode processing is isolated from 
under privileged user data or applications. The MILS architecture is targeted at 
mission critical operations where a failure cannot be even thought of. The MILS 
architecture is intended to be used at the highest levels of security. Conse-
quently, an EAL 7 will be targeted. (31.) 
 
FIGURE 11.Assurance certification goals (32.) 
The advantages of the MILS architecture (shown in figure 11 above) are:  
 Reducing the footprint of secure critical code dramatically, the lesser is 
better. 
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 Isolating the critical components and operations in the system. 
 One processor can host multiple applications at different security levels. 
(31.) 
 Certification costs are reduced since individual functions within non-secu-
rity critical layers can be certified separately. Non-critical functions can 
be certified at a lower level. (31.) 
 
FIGURE 12. Conceptual VIEW OF MILS layers (33.) 
9.3.1 Separation kernel (SK) 
Separation kernels are usually small code bases (4k) which execute close to 
hardware with the primary objective to isolate execution environments for all 
partitions. They act as a base layer interacting with hardware, effectively enforc-
ing complete separation for data and controlling the flow control in a SoC by 
providing time and storage partition between secure and unsecure operations.  
The main objectives of the secure kernel are data isolation, highly controlled in-
formation flow, data sanitization, damage limitation. (31.) 
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The kernel conceals and denies access to application data and memory con-
tents between partitions. The state of executions in the current partition will not 
affect state of executions in other partitions and vice versa. In a practical sce-
nario, it might not be desirable to achieve a total isolation between partitions as 
minimal communication across them might be needed. For such situations, the 
secure kernel defines some secure authorized channels for inter-partition com-
munications through which the data sharing can happen. The kernel takes re-
sponsibility for relinquishing shared resources and data clean up (buffers, pro-
cessor register, memory allocations) once they expire on longevity. In the event 
of security breach or an errant behaviour the secure kernel (SK) limits the dam-
age limitation in the event of a security breach or an errant behaviour from any 
application by separating the address spaces between partitions. The secure 
kernel also caters to all partitions by enforcing bounds on shared resources and 
guaranteeing minimum processing times, interrupting servicing times and ac-
cessing to resources.  
9.3.2 MILS Device Drivers 
The MILS architecture requires the kernel to be small, having a minimum 
footprint in order to be fully evaluated. In any typical microkernel architecture, 
other needed OS services are typically included in the operating system running 
either as separate threads or processes but not in the kernel space, such as 
any other monolithic kernel (30.). But in the MILS architecture, these services 
are confined to play in address spaces of individual partitions or relegated to 
separate shared partitions if they service shared resources, such as 
communication across partitions, but are mediated by the separation kernel 
policy. When the device is categorized as private and un-sharable, access to 
the device is restricted to other partitions other than to partition where the 
device is configured to access. Their general access via MMUs needs to be 
curtailed down (memory mapped I/Os to communicate with devices) for private 
configured devices. (See figure 13, p 54) 
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9.3.3 Hardware support 
The Secure kernel needs to support the underlying hardware for effectively 
executing partitioning, controlling information flow and isolating system 
resources. The SKPP (secure kernel protection profile) mandates certain 
functional requirements from hardware in which the secure kernel will operate 
on. 
The support from the hardware MMU (Memory Management Unit) is needed for 
the separation kernel to isolate memory address spaces from various partitions. 
Processors should provide an ability for the separation kernel to grant the 
configuration access for memory layouts partitions in the system. The processor 
SDK needs to provide a privileged instruction set that can only be executed by 
the separation kernel along with the mechanism to transfer the execution 
control to the separation kernel in the event of execution of any high privileged 
operation or invalid instruction from any partitions. The underlying hardware 
needs to provide the atomicity support for critical operations, such as partition 
swapping and memory layout changes made by the separation kernel. The 
processor should also provide the separation kernel with options to restrict or 
configure access of i/o peripherals to specific partitions. 
9.3.4 Middleware services 
Middleware layers sit on top of the separation kernel providing services to 
applications and services in a particular partition. Some of the examples are 
inter-core communications, event and diagnostic logging, resource sharing and 
allocation. In addition to the above mentioned, the middleware layer is also 
responsible for the end to end security and communication policy by labeling, 
filtering and controlling the message/information flow. Middleware services can 
also be designed for authorized communication channels between specific 
partitions dictated by use case requirements. These services should address 
solutions from end to end across multiple partitions and cores rather than 
confine to a single process, partition or core. 
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FIGURE 13. MILS Architecture (33.) 
9.4 Trusted execution environment (TEE) 
The Global Platform defines the TEE as a combination of a hardware platform, 
which provides isolation, and a software and operating system residing within 
the security domain defined by that hardware which is capable of running pro-
grams launched into that environment. This software running in the isolated en-
vironment is responsible for executing critical secure applications which access 
critical resources as part of their use cases. Systems that need to run secure 
use cases can deploy the TEE run in the secure environment to better protect 
their secrets, for example  smart cards and DRM applications.  
TEE supporting hardware platforms will come with a trusted operating system or 
some kind of task scheduler which runs in the hardware isolated environment 
as a software solution. This piece of software has access to the root of trust. It 
supports provisioning and has access to the Cryptographic API for accessing 
device secrets there by forming a core for the TEE.(See figure 14 , page 55.) 
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FIGURE 14. TEE Architecture (34.) 
Secure hardware elements provide a trusted execution environment by creating 
a secure world (isolated environment) in a different core other than the one that 
runs normal world applications for software to operate in. More about the role 
played by hardware is discussed in the later part of the document that deals 
with the device security in general. The core that operates the TEE comes with 
immutable ROM boot code which does not need software checks that are 
needed to put the processor to a secure context. 
9.5 Virtualization 
Through virtualization, a secure isolated environment can be created by host 
operating systems by leveraging on OS concepts, such as isolating the pro-
cessing contexts and memory for all the running environments. Here, the host 
environment is securely booted with a higher security privilege and will have 
enough security mechanisms in place to protect itself from other executing ap-
plications. This host operating system will typically operate smaller microkernels 
or hypervisor, whose trust bases are quite small, can be validated without much 
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complexity. Using this mechanism, smaller virtualized environments are em-
ployed to run secure use cases, post its code base validation by larger parental 
OS environments and under its security kernel.  
Employing virtualization for facilitating the TEE also has some vulnerabilities as 
explained below 
 Virtualization technology for achieving a trusted execution environment 
as a security solution can be a risk as it is vulnerable to hardware at-
tacks.  
 In this approach, a larger conventional operating system or hypervisor 
enjoy higher privilege contexts leaving the virtualized environment OS to 
work under the user level. In this case, the virtualized OS that provides 
the TEE might not have full capabilities to protect its own kernel and ap-
plications running under its hood.  
9.6 Platform security 
Operating systems also play a vital role in ensuring the device security whether 
it can be a traditional rich OS (Android & Linux) or an OS residing in an isolated 
execution environment. Below various security measures, which traditional op-
erating systems provide are discussed in detail.  
9.6.1 Process Isolation 
Process isolation as the term self-explain relates to an isolation of an individual 
process from the address space of other processes made possible by the un-
derlying kernel to prevent one process either accidently or intentionally writing 
into each other’s space. The interaction between processes can still be made 
possible by IPC mechanisms, sockets and shared memory resources with the 
help of kernel. On the other side, most of the operating systems also provide a 
sandboxing mechanism to facilitate a highly controlled environment, which pro-
vides a controlled set of resources accessible for a set of programs. By using 
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this mechanism, processes can be launched in their own private directory, invis-
ible to other processes, and they work seamlessly with the existing application 
code to eliminate an entire class of security threats. Programs, such as access 
to certain IO operations, system inspection, and network access, can be re-
stricted to these sandboxed applications.  Few examples of sandboxing mecha-
nisms are virtual machines, jails and containers in Linux. 
9.6.2 Access Control permissions 
To achieve platform protection, operating systems typically control access to 
system resources (files, directories, sockets, drivers) on who (subjects) should 
be able to access and what permission levels subjects have over the resources. 
Below different mechanisms to achieve this and their levels of protection will be 
discussed.  Access control mechanisms can be broadly split into a discretionary 
access control and a mandatory access control.  
Discretionary Access Control 
The Discretionary access control is the most flexible access control mechanism. 
It allows users to control its own data. Under this Discretionary Access Control 
mechanism, access properties for objects are stored in Access Control Lists 
(ACL) which are associated with the object.  
In the Unix DAC, the ACL lists form the backbone for the OS security model, 
Programs launched by a user run with all of the rights of that user, whether they 
need them or not.  There is also a super user category, which is a more power-
ful entity that bypasses the Unix DAC policy for the purpose of managing the 
system.  When any object is accessed in any form (read, write or execute), the 
operating system checks the rules contained in the ACL list for that object and 
makes a decision accordingly. This policy is implemented as permission bits at-
tached to the file's inode, which may be set by the owner of the file.  Permis-
sions for accessing the file, such as read and write, may be set separately for 
the owner, a specific group, and other (i.e. everyone else) which is a relatively 
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simple form of access control lists (ACLs). (35.) Running a program as the su-
per user provides that program with all rights on the system. (35.) There are 
also other ALC mechanisms that deal with more fine grained schemes allowing 
separate permissions for different users and groups for the same resource. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
Unlike the DAC, the Security policy in MAC is administered centrally, and users 
cannot fully control the policies for their own resources.  This helps in containing 
attacks which exploit bugs in user space software. The access control in this 
mechanism is wound around roles rather than users, which suits well for organi-
zations where users and their permission to resources can be tagged against 
roles they have in the organization. The MAC brings in an additional layer of 
permissions which is associated with the user identity. Every object inside the 
system has its own label associated with the object. Now, based upon permis-
sions granted to the subject (user) associated with user’s role or group, they 
can only perform actions on tagged objects if there exists an explicit policy 
which grants access to the object. Conversely, a policy can be drafted based 
upon tags/labels to explicitly deny the access to certain users or groups. 
The Role Based Access Control (RBACL) is a widely adopted mandatory ac-
cess control mechanism around for quite some time. The Role based access 
control is more rigid in a way that access to resources cannot be granted above 
the role permits even though the user needs extra explicit permissions for the 
resource. In the Linux world, SELinux, SMACK and AppArmour are widely used 
implementations for the MAC. As part of the Android security model, Android 
uses SELinux to enforce the mandatory access control (MAC) over all pro-
cesses, even processes running with root/superuser privileges (a.k.a. Linux ca-
pabilities). SELinux enhances the Android security by confining privileged pro-
cesses and automating the security policy creation. (36.) (See figure 15 p 59) 
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FIGURE 15.  MAC vs DAV vs RBC (37.) 
 
9.6.3 Operating systems support and extensions 
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
Operating system kernels can be configured to use ASLR which enables ran-
domizations of load address in memory areas for key sections of binaries and 
libraries from the user space, e.g base address, mapping of libraries, stack and 
heap addresses. These kinds of randomizations will help preventing a buffer 
overflow, a code injection and a return-to-libc attack which are difficult to exploit 
relying on luck to break into. External PaX projects such as Exec Shield and 
grsecurity projects have long maintained patches to the Linux kernel for these 
software-based hardening features. Android 4.0 has support for the ASLR com-
pletely discarding the support for the non-position independent execution sup-
port from 5.0. 
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The operating systems also supports hardware security features such as NX 
(Non-Execute), VT-d (Virtualization Technology), TPM, TXT (Trusted Execu-
tion), and SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention), along with the support 
for cryptographic operations. 
Secure Computing Mode 
A Secure computing mode is a mechanism which restricts access to system 
calls by processes.  The idea is to reduce the attack surface of the kernel by 
preventing applications from entering system calls they do not need.  The sys-
tem call API is a wide gateway to the kernel, and as with all code, there have 
been and are likely to be bugs present somewhere.  Given the privileged nature 
of the kernel, bugs in system calls are potential avenues of attack.  If an appli-
cation only needs to use a limited number of system calls, then restricting it to 
only being able to invoke those calls reduces the overall risk of a successful at-
tack. 
Memory protections 
Memory segments which host the kernel are divided into logical areas and are 
marked for protective restrictions on access permissions. Code sections of the 
operating system kernel memory are marked as read only and execute sections 
where as a data section is marked as a non-execute segment. Data sections 
are marked as no-execute and further segmented into read-only data and read-
write data sections. These features are usually enabled with kernel configura-
tion options and specialized flags that control these features. 
The operating system kernel can be further protected by restricting the kernel 
access to the user space memory directly. This can make a number of attacks 
more difficult because attackers have significantly less control over the kernel 
memory that is executable.  
9.6.4 Integrity management 
The operating systems kernel can come with an integrity management subsys-
tem which will calculate the hash of all the non-volatile files and verify them 
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against the cryptographic hashes stored in the TPM. Integrity measurement val-
ues can be verified by an external TEE OS Also tools, such as dm-verity, can 
be used to protect integrity at the block level. This module verifies the integrity 
of files block by block when the read from disk happens. 
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10 DEVICE SECURITY 
This topic discusses the methods and technologies in tandem for enhancing the 
overall security of any embedded device. At places one can notice that the top-
ics discussed earlier could have criss-crossed here, but here the same discus-
sion is more looked from the prism of overall security rather than arbitrarily 
which was the case earlier.  
10.1 Isolated Execution Environment 
The Isolating execution also often referred as a trusted execution environment 
(TEE) gives the device and also the service and providers and OEMs the ability 
to run software modules in complete isolation from untrusted code. Executing 
code and data in complete isolation provides secrecy and integrity of that mod-
ule’s code and data at run-time. Conventional rich mobile systems, such as An-
droid, IOS, Linux provide a process based isolation for protecting application 
address spaces from other applications and kernel resources. This leaves a 
possibility to circumvent the device security when the OS itself is compromised.  
Providing an isolated execution means the security no more relies on the con-
ventional rich execution environments (REE) Oss but on an alternative operat-
ing system that hosts a trusted execution environment (TEE) , made possible 
either by in SoC hardware extensions or special security coprocessors. SoCs 
that support isolated execution environments come with special hardware ex-
tension blocks which provide hardware isolation from the non-secure world. 
OEMs can configure the peripherals by restricting or extending their access ei-
ther to the isolated secure environment or to the untrusted execution environ-
ment or both. The memory isolation is provided by MMU extensions which re-
strict some predefined memory pages accessible to the processor only in a se-
cure context. But these hardware assisted methodologies are not of much help 
in case the software designed to use this is not designed well for secure use 
cases. Figure 16 explains isolated execution environments in general.  
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FIGURE 16.  ARM Trustzone Architecture (27.) 
10.2 Protection of Confidential data  
Devices should be able to protect confidential data (secrets, keys, licences, cer-
tificates) and should not reveal them to untrusted parties. Confidential data can 
be pertaining but not limited to a device (OEM), a user, an operator and a plat-
form providers meta data specific or service providers.  
The protection of confidential data is critical, The data cannot be accessed ei-
ther by network attacks, physical tampering or access by unauthorized software 
entities in the device. Embedded devices can often be reprogrammed remotely 
as a part of fixing bugs and adding new features. In due course, devices should 
ensure that attackers do not attack and insert their own malicious code and hi-
jack confidential data as it flows through the system. 
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10.3 Device Identification (via Remote Attestation) 
Remote attestation allows a remote entity to verify that a particular message 
originated from a particular software entity. (.38) Expressing this in business 
terms, service provides widely use the remote attestation to make sure that the 
device they are communicating with is the real device that they are wishing to 
talk to and not any untrusted or unknown entity.  
Trusting the device would mean attesting a certain chosen software module(s) 
or a complete stack of underlying software running along with it.  This could in 
practice mean whole operating systems. Service providers who offer secure 
services, such as payment services, can know if the communicating device soft-
ware is in rightful and known state or is operating with tampered or rooted soft-
ware. 
The attestation can be meaningful and easier to achieve when a computing 
base is relatively small, which is difficult to achieve with rich execution environ-
ments, such as Android, IOS and Linux. In practice the attestation is achieved 
via apps from service providers hosted in isolated execution environments 
which have attestation capabilities. These mechanisms are typically built using 
a private key which is only accessible by a small computing base and kept in a 
secure storage. (38.) A certificate issued by a trusted party, such as the device 
manufacturer, certifies that the corresponding public key belongs to the device. 
One or more platform configuration registers store the measurements of loaded 
code. The private key of the device can then be used to generate signed attes-
tations about its state or the state of the rest of the system. (38.) (See figure 17 , 
p.65) 
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FIGURE 17.  Top level architecture for dynamic checking in Trusted VM (39.) 
Figure 18 below denotes a health application capable of performing device at-
testation (certifying the device in a rightful state) and thereby communicating 
with the service. 
 
 66 
 
 
FIGURE 18.  Figure showing attestation procedure for a health application (40.) 
10.4  Secure provisioning 
Secure provisioning is a mechanism of sending data to a specific software mod-
ule, running on a specific device, while protecting the secrecy and integrity of 
that data. (38.) Secure provisioning comes in handy for migrating user’s data 
between user’s devices.  
Remote attestation can be used for provisioning data securely by using keys 
belonging to a particular software entity on a specific device. The sender can 
then use that key to protect data to be sent to the target software module on the 
target device. 
Some of today’s mobile and IOT platforms implement mechanisms to authenti-
cate external information from the hardware stakeholders (e.g., software up-
dates), with the hash of the public portion of the signing key stored immutably 
on the device. Regarding current and previous mobile platforms such as 
Meego, the Linux distribution for mobile devices includes provisions for the iso-
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lated execution. Meego’s Mobile Simplified Security Framework (MSSF) imple-
ments a trusted execution environment, which is protected from the OS (41.) 
Other secure provisioning mechanisms are likely implemented and used by de-
vice manufacturers to implement features, such as digital rights management. 
So far, however, secure provisioning mechanisms are not available for direct 
use by arbitrary third-party developers on mobile platforms. (38.) 
10.5 Trusted path 
Devices should be able to setup a trusted path for all related secure use cases 
to ensure the data and content protection. This can be done by enabling a set of 
security features to enable the software to run on top of hardware isolation pro-
vided by SoC. A Trusted path protects authenticity, and optionally secrecy and 
availability, of communication between a software module and a I/O peripheral 
(e.g., a keyboard or a touchscreen). (38.) Classic examples of these require-
ments are playing an DRM protected media content rendering, enabling a fin-
gerprint sensor for device locking and unlocking and providing a trusted path for 
password authentication for payment applications. Establishing a trusted path 
helps devices to protect assets against unauthorized tampering, modification of 
software by unauthorized software. Figure 19 below explains the protection 
mechanisms that are applied when rendering a DRM protected media content. 
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FIGURE 19. TEE Protection principles to media assets (42.) 
Building secure trusted paths is a challenging problem and in principle, many 
mobile platforms support a form of trusted path, but the TCB is relatively large 
and untrustworthy. (38.) This is because the computing bases of rich execution 
environments are large and it is often complex to secure trusted paths. But by 
removing the rich OS from the TCB of such trusted paths by preventing the OS 
from communicating directly with the device and running the device driver in an 
isolated environment, a trusted path can be established. But this requires the 
hardware based support for a low-level access-control policy to access to pe-
ripherals. (38.) 
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Figure 20 below from Jan-Erik and Kari (27.) shows an excellent relation be-
tween the functionalities and level of hardware support to achieve security.
 
FIGURE 20.  Concise picture showing different hardware security mechanisms 
(27.) 
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11 CONCLUSION 
Device security should be treated with paramount importance and should be in-
grained in the product design right from the conceptual phase. It should never 
be treated as “nice to have” only if time, features and functionality permit. Secu-
rity needs to be fortified by building brick by brick, multiple layers of defences 
and protection mechanisms acting in tandem. No one solution could safeguard 
the whole chain (end to end). It is also expensive, tedious and often infeasible 
to inject security in the midway of product design. Therefore, care should be 
taken right from the initial phases of design. Thus, during the conception phase 
of a product/project, security requirements need to be well understood and 
agreed in tandem with functional and non-functional requirements. 
I feel the best way to accomplish this is to base the project execution on a secu-
rity driven development (SDD) where each of the requirements  are tied down 
with a security related measure, binding or precondition.  
As part of pre-design, architects need to do an end to end threat assessment, 
figure out asset classes, come up with attack trees and entry points and attack 
categories (network, physical abuse, software, cryptographic) for the product. 
Each of them should be thoroughly discussed, considering solutions to minimize 
the attack surfaces while designing. 
In future we can expect an increased trend that software solutions will base 
their trust anchor on hardware which even semiconductor vendors/IP Licen-
sees, such as ARM, INTEL, QUALCOMM and TI are going to support with hard-
ware extensions.  
In future, I also see cloud security gaining prominence, in addition to client (de-
vice) security, as cloud offers a bigger security infrastructure in terms of data 
protection and resource availability. In days to come, I can see device security 
more restricted to establish a trust and secure connection to cloud space, where 
all the computational and storage logic is hosted. 
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From software side, I see an increasing trend towards a wider adoption of soft-
ware containers, Virtual environments, especially in cloud spaces, will achieve a 
user environment isolation and provide a better security infrastructure for appli-
cations. With an increased penetration of cloud technology, client devices could 
play an increased role in establishing a secure link, where real computational 
logic and data gets resided, between cloud and the device. 
I always advocate to solution designers to view product security from attacker’s 
point of view rather than from that of designers. Essentially it is all about the 
perception “How things should not work”. Also, it is worth noting that, no tech-
nology or solution is worth its salt if designers do not religiously follow the princi-
ples listed below while designing their product.  
 The weakest links should always be secured. For example, often in cryp-
tographic operations, it is found that the weakest links have been the pro-
cess of storing secret keys or restricting their access permissions rather 
than the cryptographic algorithm itself. It is quite usual to find keys that 
are not securely stored or not cleared from a memory once used. 
 It is not practical to design a total fool proof system. If a failure is immi-
nent and unavoidable, fail securely and limit the damage. 
 Protection and damage control gates should be built in. Always design 
for a layer of protection services to kick, in the event of breach to one of 
your defences. 
 Go by the concept of granting least privileges to resources.(E.g. avoid 
system wide blanket (sudo) permissions for the process) 
 Develop an attitude of “reluctance” to trust information from unknown 
sources/parties. 
 Avoid the security by obscurity, If OpenSource components are being 
used, be prompt to patch for security updates. 
 From coding standards, use secure coding guidelines accompanied by 
reviews, reduce the attack surfaces by reducing code bases.  
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Finally, Security has to be built across all layers of software, phases of develop-
ment (design, development, testing, deployment, maintenance), multiple do-
mains (software, hardware, firmware). It should be every designer’s responsibil-
ity and only confined to few individuals, teams or ranks. 
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